STRATEGIC ESTIMATE AND RESPONSE

TOPIC

INTRODUCTION TO STRATEGIC ESTIMATE AND RESPONSE

INTRODUCTION

INTRODUCTION

No one in his right mind starts a war without knowing what he intends to achieve by it, or how he intends to achieve it

Carl Von Clausewitz

INTRODUCTION

Ends — Ways — Means

Ends	Ways	Means
Objectives	Centre of Gravity	Capabilities
End State	Decisive Points	Resources
Criteria for Success	Operational Design	Force Mix

Carl Von Clausewitz

WAR IS POLITICAL INTERCOURSE BY VIOLENT MEANS

INTRODUCTION (CONT)

LEVELS OF 'WARFARE'

Strategic
National Strategy – Theatre Strategy

Operational
Campaign Plans – Major Operations

Tactical
Battles - Engagements

Source: FM 9-6 (U.S. Army, 1998)

❖ **Strategic – National resources are allocated to achieve the government's policy goals**

❖ **Operational – Campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to achieve strategic objectives at the operational level**

❖ **Tactical – Battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve operational objectives at the tactical level**

INTRODUCTION (CONT)

## NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING SYSTEM

INTRODUCTION (CONT_)

A Strategic Estimate refers to a logical process of reasoning by which a leader (or a government), faced with an ill-structured problem, arrives at a decision for a Response (Course of Action) to be taken in order to achieve its objectives or national interests

INTRODUCTION (CONTD)

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FRAMEWORK

TEMPLATE FOR ANALYSIS AND ACTION

PROBLEM
- Δ What is the political issue?
- Δ Why violence & what form?

ROOTS
- Δ What created and sustains the problem?

FRAME & NARRATIVE
- Δ How does the group frame and justify its cause?

THREAT STRATEGY
- Δ What is its theory of victory (E-W-M)?
- Δ What is Threat CoG and CV?

CRITIQUE PRESENT RESPONSE
- Δ What is the State(s) Perception, & Response to the threat (E-W-M)?
- Δ Why is it not working?

1. STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

2. STRATEGIC RESPONSE

CONCEPT OF (FUTURE) RESPONSE
- Δ Assessment of Estimate: What is to be done and why?
- Δ How to get at threat CoG via CV?

LEGAL
- Δ What authorities bind you and what do you need?

ASSUMPTIONS
- Δ What assumptions do you make in the absence of facts to continue planning?

HOW TO IMPLEMENT RESPONSE
- Δ Strategy for armed reform [Tangible + Intangible]
- Δ Phasing & Metrics

RISK ASSESSMENT & MITIGATION

CONCLUSIONS

3. RESOURCING

CAVEATS FOR THE STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FRAMEWORK

❑   Framework is not a checklist. Each situation will differ

❑   Participants should determine where to place emphasis and what to include

❑   Requires collating relevant data, providing analysis and drawing the appropriate deductions

❑   Analysis to be backed by compelling evidence

❑   Do not include anything in an Estimate just because the framework requires it. Participants must know the relevance of what to include

AIM

To introduce you to Strategic Estimate and Response

SCOPE

- ❑ Strategic Estimate

- ❑ Strategic Response

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

The 3 Pillars of Strategic Estimate

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

ESTIMATE

RESPONSE

RESOURCING

Source: Presenter's Compilation

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE PROCESS

❑ **Strategic Estimate Process**

  ➢ **Problem**

  ➢ **Roots**

  ➢ **Frame and Narrative**

  ➢ **Threat Strategy**

  ➢ **Present Response**

❑ **Strategic Response Process**

  ➢ **Concept of Future Response**

  ➢ **Legal**

  ➢ **How to Implement Response**

  ➢ **Risk Assessment/Mitigation**

  ➢ **Conclusion**

Source: Presenter's Compilation

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (CONTD)

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE AND RESPONSE FRAMEWORK

TEMPLATE FOR ANALYSIS AND ACTION

PROBLEM
Δ What is the political issue?
Δ Why violence & what form?

ROOTS
Δ What created and sustains the problem?

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Δ How does the group frame and justify its cause?

THREAT STRATEGY
Δ What is its theory of victory and strategy (E–W–M)?

CRITIQUE PRESENT RESPONSE
Δ What is the State(s) Perception, & Response to the threat (E–W–M)?
Δ Why is it not working?

1. STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

CONCEPT OF (FUTURE) RESPONSE
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Δ Strategy for armed reform [Tangible + Intangible]
Δ Phasing & Metrics

RISK ASSESSMENT & MITIGATION

CONCLUSIONS

2. STRATEGIC RESPONSE

3. RESOURCING

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (CONTD)

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND ACTION

PROBLEM	ROOTS	FRAME & NARRATIVE	THREAT STRATEGY	CRITIQUE PRESENT RESPONSE
∆ What is the political issue? ∆ Why violence & what form?	∆ What created and sustains the problem?	∆ How does the group frame and justify its cause?	∆ What is its theory of victory (E-W-M)? ∆ What is Threat CoG and CV?	∆ What is the State(s) Perception, & Response to the threat (E-W-M)? ∆ Why is it not working?

1. STRATEGIC ESTIMATE

Really just 5 questions:

- What is the problem right now?

- Where did it come from?

- What does it claim it is doing and how does it justify this?

- What is it doing do accomplish its goals?

- What is the Government currently doing to counter it and why is it not working?

PROBLEM

Δ What is the political issue?
Δ Why violence & what form?

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (CONTD)

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND ACTION (CONTD)

PROBLEM

❖ **What is the Political Issue?**

❖ **Why violence & what form?**

❑ What political issue has caused the violence?

❑ What is the nature of the threat behind the violence? (Terrorist group, insurgency, militia, transnational crime or a combination)

❑ The nature of the threat will often relate to why has the group resorted to violence and how it uses violence: What form does it take and what is its strategic function

EXAMPLE OF PROBLEM STATEMENT COUNTER AL-SHAABAB THREAT IN KENYA

Al Shaabab which is designated a terrorist group by the international community conducts lethal violence in Somalia, Kenya and the rest of the Eastern African region. With revolutionary Maoist terrorist activities. AS uses a religious ideology operating in a clandestine manner using terrorism as a method.

They aim to force Kenya to pull troops from AMISOM in Somalia and claim their political objectives for rule over Somalia, governing it through strict sharia laws.

They are using violence to intimidate the Kenyan Government to pull it forces out of Somalia

Al Shabaab

Source : Google Images

EXAMPLE OF PROBLEM STATEMENT (CONT)

The violence initially erupted in 1998 when Al Queda associates attacked Mombasa in 2002. Al-Shabaab intensified attacks in Kenya launched Operation LINDA NCHI (protect the nation), which is a strategy to degrade AS bases in Somalia as part of AMISOM.

The strategic relationship between Kenya and Somalia historically is described as intimacy-tensions and conflict. The relations have been frost before independence due to the demarcation of boundaries. However, it was after the fall of Siad Barre that the chaos in Somalia threatened neighboring countries in the region, especially in Kenya where there was huge Somalia refugees' influx.

Somalia increasingly became the sanctuary of terrorist cells. It is suspected that the terrorists who launched the 2002 terrorist attacks around Mombasa entered Kenya through Somalia. It was after the abduction and killing of tourists at Lamu and aid workers in the eastern region that Kenya realized that it is to its strategic interest to ensure that AS are not allowed to reign both in Somalia and Kenya.

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE PROCESS

Who

Where

What

When

Why

How

PROBLEM

△ What is the political issue?
△ Why violence & what form?

Al-Shabaab is an internationally designated terrorist group "Harakat Ash- Shabaab Al Mujahadeen" which conducts lethal violence in Somalia, Kenya and the rest of the Eastern Africa region. The group main bases exist in Somalia and its cells operate in North Eastern and Coastal parts of Kenya. Al Shabaab has been conducting terrorist activities in Kenya since 2011 with the Mwara Downtown Street attacks that killed 2 persons through 2013 – 2015 with the Westgate Mall attack that killed 67 people and the Garrissa Unversity College attack that killed 147 students. Their recent attack was as recent as 6 Jan attack at Dusti Hotel that killed 14 people. The Group is Maoist insurgency using terrorism as a method.

2.   They aim to force Kenya to pull out their troops from AMISOM in Somalia and claim their political objectives for rule over Somalia, governing it through strict sharia laws. The Government of Kenya is finding it difficult to counter because the group has infiltrated the large Somali refugees in Kenya and a radicalized youths in certain parts of North Eastern Region of Kenya who have join their ranks.

EXAMPLE OF PROBLEM STATEMENT (CONT)

The map of Somalia and neighboring countries is shown below.

Map of Somalia
Source: Google Images

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (CONTD)

ROOTS

Δ What created and sustains the problem?

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (CONTD)

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND ACTION (CONTD)

Roots of the Conflict

ROOTS

∆ What created and sustains the problem?

- What created and sustain the threat?

- What contextual factors are impacting individuals that produce grievances the system (state, society, family) is unwilling or unable to mediate?

- Are individuals in the society able to find redress through the existing Political Opportunity Structure? Why or Why Not?

- How and why did an organisation emerge to fill the void where the system had failed?

- Where did the leaders of this organisation come from?

- Who are the followers that join the organisation? Who stays? Who leaves?

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (CONTD)

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND ACTION (CONTD)

Roots of the Conflict

ROOTS

Δ What created and sustains the problem?

- Macro
  - Contextual factors: geographic, historical, economic, social and political

- Micro
  - The individual in society.
  - How do these Macro issues impact individuals in actual or perceived ways to produce grievances?

- Meso
  - The organisation – the social movement.
  - How did it emerge as a way for individual to find redress of grievances?

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (CONT)

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE: ROOTS

Macro, Micro, Meso Illustrated

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE AND RESPONSE TO COUNTER AL-SHAABAB

EXAMPLE OF ROOTS WITH AL –SHAABAB KENYAN CONFLICT

Schmid (2013) provides a model of analysis through macro/micro/meso evaluation of the Al-Shabaab group. In the macro level, the estimate will examine the role of government and society both domestically and internationally, radicalization of public opinion and party politics and the tense majority-minority relationships, the role of socio-economic opportunities for whole sectors of society which leads to radicalization of the discontented.

Here, analysis of geographical, historical, economic, social and political factors contributes to a deep level understanding of the drivers toward radicalization.

Al Shabaab Group

Source : Google Images

ROOTS

Macro
Contextual factor: Geography

Somalia is in Eastern Africa bordering the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean to the East, Ethiopia and Kenya to the South West. The country is mostly arid with irregular rainfall, hot and humid periods between monsoons. The country is sparsely populated with most of the people living in the rural areas.

This makes government presence difficult to be established in the vast area considering the capacity of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.

EXAMPLE OF ROOTS WITH AL –SHAABAB KENYAN CONFLICT

Macro (contd)
Contextual factor: Geography (contd)

The Kenya–Somalia border stretches about 682 km and the Government of Kenya maintains five official crossing points along this stretched border.

This expansive border-line, coupled with arid plains create unpatrolled lands from either side of the porous border. Boni Forest dominates the county of Lamu in Kenya, which is in close proximity to the Somalia border, which makes it easy for Al-Shabaab to conduct cross-border incursions. The Somalia's Government lacks the capacity to control its territorial waters thereby leading to piracy and other crimes.

EXAMPLE OF ROOTS WITH AL –SHAABAB KENYAN CONFLICT

THE MAP SHOWING AREAS OF AL-SHABAAB ATTACKS/ACTIVITIES

Macro
Contextual factor: Geography

Al-Shabaab Attacks from January 1st 2020 – March 9th

Source : Armed Conflict Location Event Data 2021

EXAMPLE OF ROOTS WITH AL –SHAABAB KENYAN CONFLICT

Macro (contd)
Contextual factor: History

Bruce Hoffman (2014) traces the origin of Al-Shabaab to the Islamic Courts Union (ICU). He argues that the chance that gave prominence to the group is the Ethiopian invasion of Somalia to remove the ICU in 2006. To understand the history of the leverage of Al-Shabaab in Kenya, it is important to look at the history of the North Eastern Region (NER). The NER was called the Northern Frontier District during the British rule. At Independence, the region wanted to secede from Kenya and join Somalia giving reasons of identity, common culture and language.

This resulted to conflict that was dubbed the 'Shifta Campaign' between both countries. In July 1967 the Kenyan government signed a truce with the Somali government and the area was declared part of Kenya. Appropriate measures were not taken to integrate the NER into the rest of the country and dissenting voices were suppressed with excessive force. The infrastructural and socio-economic development in the region are very low. The Al-Shabaab capitalized on this in the NER to propagate its cause.

EXAMPLE OF ROOTS WITH AL –SHAABAB KENYAN CONFLICT

Macro
Contextual Factor: Political

As argued by Peter Thompson (2014), just like insurgency, terrorists have political objectives – these include regime change, policy reform, or greater access to the political process. Al-Shabaab initially sought to oust the Transitional Federal Government since they considered it a puppet government backed by Ethiopia and Kenya. External interventions by Ethiopia and later AMISOM forces including Kenya provided the chance for the propaganda, rallying and mobilization tool.

Al Shabaab

Source : Google Images

EXAMPLE OF ROOTS WITH AL –SHAABAB KENYAN CONFLICT

Macro
Contextual factor: Political

External interventions by Ethiopia and later AMISOM forces including Kenya provided the chance for the propaganda, rallying and mobilization tool. While Al-Shabaab is pushing to take over political leadership of Somalia, its long-term desired goal is to establish a caliphate of the Somali nation including the north-eastern and the coastal strip of Kenya.

Meanwhile it is pushing for Kenya to change its policy towards the mission in Somalia – to pull out Kenyan troops from Somalia.

Al Shabaab contends it can achieve this by making the NER and parts of the coastal region of Kenya ungovernable.

EXAMPLE OF ROOTS WITH AL –SHAABAB KENYAN CONFLICT

Macro
Contextual factor: Economy

Berdal and Malone (2000) argue that there is always an economic agenda to a conflict. They argue that economic opportunities could have been ignited by the conflict but the presence of international agencies in the effort to provide humanitarian assistance creates other economic opportunities for the local participants. In Somalia, Al-Shabaab controlled several ports including the port of Kismayo until they were expelled by the Kenya Defense Forces.

Al-Shabaab raised between USD 38 million and USD 56 million in 2014 alone from charcoal sales and port taxes. By 2012 Al-Shabaab was charging about USD 200,000 per ship captured by pirates. Thus, this loss creates deep grievances against Kenya. Gottlieb Stuart (2013) agrees that socio-economic conditions contribute towards radicalization and religious extremism. A World Bank report in 2016 asserts that over half of the population of Somalia live below the poverty line with a third of the country's revenue coming from donor funds. Munene and Ruto (2015) acknowledge that the majority of the people living in the NER of Kenya live below the poverty line and the area is the least developed part of the country. This according to Gottlieb can be used as a major grievance and justification for violence.

Infrastructure within the NER remains undeveloped hence makes the region inaccessible especially during the rainy season which leads to the population feeling marginalized.

EXAMPLE OF ROOTS WITH AL –SHAABAB KENYAN CONFLICT

Micro

Contextual Factor: Individual

Lack of good governance, the disillusion of the country being occupied by foreign forces and the economic challenges, lack of access to services that led to dissatisfaction put pressure on the individual and became the trigger for Al-Shabaab to mobilize the population and gain support. The political void created by ICU meant that the population had to obtain some form of governance hence creating enough grounds for the sprouting of Al-Shabaab to provide a sense of identity and belonging.

Revenge-motivated individuals who felt aggrieved by some of the activities done by the Ethiopian and Kenyan forces as reason to join Al-Shabaab. People with a criminal record also joined as a way to escape from the police. Individuals are motivated by economic and political grievances, financial incentives made the group attractive to the unemployed youth both in Somalia and Kenya.

EXAMPLE OF ROOTS WITH AL –SHAABAB KENYAN CONFLICT

Micro

Contextual Factor: Individual

EXAMPLE OF ROOTS WITH AL –SHAABAB KENYAN CONFLICT

Meso: Group formed

When the macro level factors including the geographical, historical, economic, social and political impact on the individual (the micro level), it could give rise to movements (meso) that could be non-violent or violent such as the Al-Shabaab. At this level, the estimate investigates supportive or even complicit social surrounding that serve as rallying points to Al-Shabaab's broader constituency that feels aggrieved. Al-Shabaab was formed as a youth wing of the Islamic Court Union. However, after the 2006 Ethiopian invasion of Somalia, ICU faded away and Al-Shabaab became the main focus because of its lethal violence approach and use of terrorism as a method to force the Ethiopians and Kenyan troops out of Somalia.

Ethiopian invasion of Somalia

Source : Google Images

EXAMPLE OF ROOTS WITH AL –SHAABAB KENYAN CONFLICT

Meso

The Muslim youth in Somalia, NER and parts of coastal strip of Kenya were attracted to the group for several reasons. Al-Shabaab viewed the ICU as weak and incapable of fighting the invading Ethiopian troops in 2006, and the Kenyan forces that invaded Somalia in 2011. Al-Shabaab attracted recruits by advocating for violence against the invading troops. The influence of solidarity and taking part in a rebellious counter-culture was also used to influence potential recruits in Somalia and Kenya.

Religious messaging and erosion of family structures formed some of the meso factors that contributed to attract people to join the group. Al-Shabaab also coerced individuals to join it against their will through kidnappings or threats to kill some members of their family. The youth distrust of Kenyan security officials on implicating them or profiling them as Al-Shabaab sympathizers is also a reason to join the group.

FRAME &
NARRATIVE

Δ How does the
group frame and
justify its cause?

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (CONT)

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND ACTION

Frame and Narrative

FRAME & NARRATIVE

● How does the group frame and justify its cause?

- Frame (3 types or combinations)

- **Diagnostic**
- **Prognostic**
- **Motivational**
- What project is it engaging in?
- Often illustrated with an image or slogan that will resonate with followers and recruits.
- Group's ideology frames what it is going

- Narrative

- How does the group justify what it is doing?
- A narrative explanation of justification for what the group is doing?
- Often includes grievances that have now become causes.
- Group's narrative challenges the legitimacy of the state.

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE: FRAME AND NARRATIVE

FRAME & NARRATIVE

Δ How does the group frame and justify its cause?

1. **Identify and analyze, for the threat group**

   (a) Its diagnostic frame (ident of problem and apportioning of blame)
   (b) Its prognostic frame (suggest a solution – as it concerns violence);
   **(c) its motivational frame (its stated necessity for individual participation, despite risks)**

For each, explain the narrative used by the group to explain to the world, advocate for a solution, and compel individual participation.

Explain the group's use of frame alignment (achieving resonance with broader cultural structure in which the movement operates)

NOTE: THIS IS WRITTEN FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE THREAT GROUP

FRAME AND NARRATIVE (AL-SHABAB)

FRAME & NARRATIVE

Δ How does the group frame and justify its cause?

- ## Diagnostic Frame

Foreign invaders supported by western governments have invaded our country and installed a puppet regime in order to prevent us from living our way of life and practicing our religion under sharia law.

- ## Prognostic Frame

The expulsion of all foreign invaders and their puppet government from Somalia for the establishment of an Islamic state in Somalia governed

- ## Motivational Frame

The resistance against all the foreign invaders is a religious duty upon all Somalis nationals everywhere and upon fellow Muslims.

NOTE: THIS IS WRITTEN FROM THE THREAT GROUP'S POINT OF VIEW

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB FRAME AND NARRATIVE

Frame

Al-Shabaab uses hybrid of diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frame type by promising a better Somalia under their control as well as the unification of the Muslim umma in Somalia, NER and coastal parts of Kenya.

They have anchored their frame on religious ideology insisting on practicing strict sharia law according to their interpretation. The group uses the famous Muslim flag as their main rallying and mobilization symbol.

Al-Shabaab flag

Source : Google Images

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB FRAME AND NARRATIVE

Frame (contd)

The flag spells the Shahada which is the first pillar of Islam and denotes profession of faith. The upper part stating that "there is no other God, but Allah and He alone is to be worshipped." The second part states that "Mohamed is not only a prophet but the messenger of Allah." This is an important and an obligatory pillar of the Muslim faith that all practicing Muslims are obliged to follow.

A true Muslim is perceived as the one that bears witness and testifies to this pillar. It is by proclaiming this declaration that one becomes a Muslim. All Muslims are expected to understand and assent to this.

The black flag carries traditional respect in Islam. By using this pillar and identifying themselves with faith, they attract and justify their struggle as a jihad. Another key symbol of Al-Shabaab is the logo.

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB FRAME AND NARRATIVE

Frame (contd)

The upper part of the logo spells the name of the group which is "Harikat- Al-Shabaab al- mujahidin." This means the "Youth Movement or movement of striving youth." It can also be loosely translated to mean 'The Guys' which is more appealing to the youth because it sounds cool.

The writings in the logo above the Quran again restates the Shahada. The Quran symbolizes holiness and the two rifles imply they are fighting a holy war. This frame is appealing to the youth and the larger radicalized Somalis that are bound to practice extremist Ideology.

Al-Shabaab logo

Source : Google Images

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB FRAME AND NARRATIVE

Frame (contd)

This is appealing to the youth and hence a great mobilization frame for the group which want to associate the youth with heroic deeds. The group mobilization ideology is mainly a Maoist one that capitalizes on religion as the key factor of mobilization.

Maoism is used to mobilize the disfranchised population in Somalia because of resisting foreign occupation. Al-Shabaab uses this by invoking that the elites associated with the Transitional Government supported by AMISOM are puppets of the West and so the rural population must resist its governance.

The youth from NER and coastal areas of Kenya are targeted as foreign fighters who are encouraged to join by the narrative of fighting a holy war against infidels.

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB FRAME AND NARRATIVE

Narrative (contd)

The group justifies what it is doing by giving nationalism rhetoric and religious-based narratives through social media and videos posted on You Tube. Its main targeted audience is first Somalis in Somalia especially the youth and those in the diaspora. Secondly, they target Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia and within the Muslim community in Kenya.

Next is the Muslim in the diaspora who believe in Wahhabism, they are to assist by either joining as fighters or by funding the group. Salafism and Wahhabism are Islamic ideologies and reform movements calling a return to traditional Islam practices without considerations to modernity. This narrative is used to mobilize in the NER because of the conservative nature of the population in this area both religiously and culturally as those who believe in Wahhabism reject perceived adulteration of Islam by Western lifestyle.

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB FRAME AND NARRATIVE

Narrative (contd)

The native Somalis are mobilized on the narrative of fighting for the mother land against occupying forces including AMISOM and against what they consider to be a puppet government of the West. The rest of the community are mobilized on the narrative that they have an Islamic obligation to join and fight against the infidels.

The group has with time transformed its narrative from that based on nationalist rhetoric to one that is grounded in broader extremist ideology that seeks to take over governance in order to rule with strict sharia law to that of establishment of a regional caliphate to unite the greater Somali nation and the Muslims of coastal Kenya.

Native Somalis

Source : Google Images

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB FRAME AND NARRATIVE

Narrative (contd)

Al-Shabaab exaggerates its reports by use of political propaganda depicting the AMISOM troops as cowards who do not care about civilians. One of the propaganda narratives of the group is stated below.

We here remind the AMISOM mercenary forces and those with them that, with grace from Allah, we will not delay a single moment to fight them, and that we have not forgotten the crimes committed against the Muslims in the black continent and elsewhere.

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB FRAME AND NARRATIVE

Narrative (contd)

An audio propaganda message regarding AMISOM mission, March 2014

The first priority [of the military campaign] is to divide what is left of the country between Ethiopia and Kenya under the guise of regional administration. The second objective is to loot the natural resources of the country both directly and indirectly through the apostate government, the third objective is to fight against the implementation of sharia under al-Shabaab rule and prevent the people from finding peace and a good life under their religion. The fourth one is to once again incite in the country into violence based on communities and tribes after they have become united under the law of God. "Their fifth objective is how Ethiopia can realize its dream of once and for all getting its hands on the coastal areas of Somalia

The propaganda narratives are designed to mobilize the population against the efforts of AMISOM and therefore make the population view AMISOM troops as the enemy rather than stabilizing force.

THREAT STRATEGY

Δ   What is its theory of victory (E-W-M)?

Δ   What is Threat CoG and CV?

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (CONT)

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND ACTION

Threat Group Strategy

- What is the group's theory of victory?
  - Declared political objective(s)
  - Strategic concept
  - Operational course(s) of action

- What is its Center of Gravity and Critical Vulnerability.

- Strategy: articulated in an Ends-Ways-Means Construct.
  - What are the goals of the threat and how do these relate to the political essence of the conflict?
  - How does the group seek to mediate grievances and counteract alternation of the people?

- Ways (Mao's Rive Lines of Effort)
  - What is the group doing politically?
  - How does the group use violence?
  - How does the group use non-violence?
  - Who are the allies outside of the movement?
  - How is the group internationalizing the conflict?
  - Insurgencies use elements of all 5 lines.
  - Terrorists only use violence.

- Means: What is the group using its manpower, money and material for?

THREAT STRATEGY

Δ What is its theory of victory (E-W-M)?

Δ What is Threat CoG and CV?

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE: THREAT STRATEGY (CONT)

Threat Group Strategy — Ways
Mao's Five Lines of Effort

THREAT STRATEGY
- What is its theory of victory and strategy (E-W-M)?
- What is Threat CoG and CV?

Political LOE

Mobilization of Manpower Campaign → Mobilization of Resources Campaign → Governance Campaign

OBJ: Creation & Governance of Counter-states

Violent LOE

Terrorism Campaign → Guerrilla Warfare Campaign → Mobile Warfare Campaign

OBJ: Shape the Backspace for the Application of Politics

- Political Line of Effort
- Creation and governance of the Counter-state
- Mobilization of Manpower Campaign
- Mobilization of Resources Campaign
- Governance Campaign

- Violent Line of Effort
- Terrorism Campaign
- Guerrilla Campaign
- Mobile Warfare Campaign
- War of Position Campaign

- Non-violent Line of Effort
- Intelligence Campaign
- Infowar Campaign
- Netwar Campaign
- Negotiations Campaign
- Subversion Campaign
- Lawfare Campaign

- International Line of Effort

- Allies Line of Effort

NOTE: THIS IS WRITTEN FROM THE THREAT GROUP'S POINT OF VIEW

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE: THREAT STRATEGY (CONT)

The threat you are addressing may be potential, individual, or group. The totality of Ends, Ways, and Means comprise the threat group's strategy.

Ends – what are the goals of the threat and how do these relate to the political essence of the conflict? How does the group, through these goals, seek to mediate grievances and counteract alienation?

Ways – What is the group's strategic approach? (People's War, non-violence, ...)
- Campaigning: How will the threat implement this strategy?
- What are their Lines of Effort (LOE) and what campaigns?
  - What, if anything, is the group doing politically (to mobilize manpower and resources, as well as govern that which it holds)

Means - What are the groups resources, structures and materiel. Diagrams and maps can be quite important here

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB STRATEGY

The group threat strategy will be assessed in this estimate using the ends, ways and means model. The ways will be evaluated using the Mao lines of effort model as advanced by Ucko and Marks (2018).

The Maoist theory asserts that to seize power one has to mobilize people politically, win allies who will support the cause, use violence as appropriate, use non-violent efforts such as negotiations or subversions and internationalize the struggle.

The Mao lines of effort

POLITICAL	Build the counter-state	Govern the counter-state		
VIOLENCE	Terrorism	Guerrilla Warfare	Mobile Warfare	War of Position
NON-VIOLENCE	Information Warfare	Lawfare	Protest	Subversion	Negotiations
ALLIES	Front organizations	Influenced Organizations	'Useful idiots'	
INTER-NATIONAL	International organizations	States	Individuals	

Source : Google Images

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB STRATEGY

Ends

The Al-Shabaab goals are to seize political power in Somalia and govern using strict sharia law while enforcing extremist beliefs. Secondly, to establish a regional Caliphate in the eastern Africa region specifically covering Somalia, eastern Ethiopia, northeastern Kenya and the coastal parts of Kenya.

Al-Shabaab

Source : Google Images

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB STRATEGY

Ways

Political Line of Effort

Al-Shabaab created governance of the counter state by establishing governance structure in areas it controls within Somalia. Its system of governance incorporates military and administrative wings. It provides social services and also collect taxes. It has tried to gain popular support by developing infrastructure and even distribute money to the poor. Al-Shabaab has a supreme commander who is the Amir assisted by the Shura Council which is a policy making body.

There are junior Amirs in charge of different branches of governance including politics, media and military operations. There are two sub-branches under the military namely Jaysh Al-Usr (Army of Hardship and Suffering) and Jaysh Al- Hisbah which is in charge of judiciary, social and economy.

THE THREAT STRATEGY

Ways (contd)

Political Line of Effort (contd)

They have geographic regional commanders for administration. The group mobilizes manpower using the Maoist approach where the population is galvanized using Wahhabism and Salafism religious based ideologies.

They mainly target local population as its bulk force and Kenyan Muslims from both Somalis and non- Somali tribes.

The group mobilizes resources through the illegal trade of smuggled sugar, taxation within area of control, zakat and money from diaspora.

THE THREAT STRATEGY

Ways (contd)

Violent Line of Effort

The group started with guerilla type of warfare between 2006 and 2008. In this phase Al-Shabaab focused on waves of hit and run attacks on the Somali Federal Government forces and AMISOM troops with an intention of damaging the economy of the Somali government and to demoralize the AMISOM troops.

They conducted terrorist activities with extreme aggression and brutality, attacking multiple targets and locations.

The Guerilla Type of Warfare

Source : Google Images

THE THREAT STRATEGY

Ways (contd)

Violent Line of Effort (contd)

Between 2008 and 2009 they were mainly engaged in a war of movement which was characterized by violent resistance through ambushes and IED attacks intended to send a clear message to AMISOM and the Government of Somalia. From 2009, after the withdrawal of the Ethiopian troops to about 2012, they were fighting a war of position which is to fight and occupy territory. They also conducted massive attacks on AMISOM including the Kenya Defence Forces (KDF) that had launched Operation LINDA NCHI in 2011.

However, after losing Kismayo in 2012, they resorted to operating between guerilla warfare and war of movement in order to avoid aerial bombardment from Kenya's Air Force and US drones.

THE THREAT STRATEGY

Ways (contd)

Non-Violent Line of Effort

The use of internet and social media has really assisted Al-Shabaab in propagating its narrative as well as attract foreign fighters. From 2008, the group's media branch extensively used the internet for information warfare to recruit, sell its narrative, raise fund and motivate foreigners to join.

It has also utilized the internet for portraying itself as a winning group thereby attracting young people who are seeking quick glory and heroism. The group also maintains some level of media influence within Somalia including radio broadcasts.

THE THREAT STRATEGY

Ways (contd)

Allies Line of Effort

The group has no known ally within Somalia other than the support it gets from some of the population at the village level, including clan elders. Some warlords did initially support the group against the Ethiopian troops for fear that the entrance of the Ethiopian troops would interfere with and destabilize their revenue bases and interfere with the status quo.

Ethiopian troops

Source : Google Images

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB STRATEGY

Ways (contd)

International Line of Effort

Al-Shabaab associates itself with Al-Qaida openly, probably for the purpose of attracting foreign fighters as well as funding.

Youth from Kenya and other parts of eastern Africa have joined the group as foreign fighters. Some state actors including Eritrea are alleged to support the group.

Eritrea has however, denied the allegation. However, the fact that the group has attracted foreign fighters from different countries and necessitated troops from the African Union to fight against it, has successfully internationalized the conflict.

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB STRATEGY

The Means

The group organizational structure is as shown in the diagram below which provide it with the basic means of waging its operations.

Basically, it uses its military wing for direct attacks, launching vehicle borne IEDs and suicide attacks to prosecute its violent line of effort. It uses its administrators, the judicial and military commanders and the Shura Council for the political line of effort and the media branch for executing the non-violent line of effort including cyber information operations. It raises funds through various means including criminal activities such as piracy and kidnapping amongst others.

The Al-Shabaab Organizational Structure

Source : Google Images

EXAMPLE OF AL-SHAABAB COG ANALYSIS

Centre of Gravity	Critical Capabilities
Critical Vulnerabilities	Critical Requirements

THE THREAT CENRE OF GRAVITY

- ❑ Al-Shabaab's centre of gravity is the population both in Somalia and the NER and parts of coastal region of Kenya

- ❑ It has convinced a part of the population that they are obligated to support them as genuine Muslims either through material support, cover or intelligence

- ❑ The group has created significant links with the local communities that it is able to get supplies to sustain itself

- ❑ The group is composed mainly of Somalis, and NER of Kenya, this makes it easy for them to blend and swim in the population like fish in the water

CRITICAL CAPABILITIES

❑ Al-Shabaab critical capability is assessed to be its resilience and ability to mingle with the population.

❑ Despite suffering defeat in many battles and losing ground the group is still able to conduct attacks both in Somalia and in Kenya

❑ It has a strong will to fight based on religious ideological orientation

❑ It also has a robust and efficient bureaucracy that has systematized the group revenue collections

❑ Its ability to utilize the internet and social media to propagate its agenda, frame and narrative is also a critical capability

CRITICAL REQUIREMENTS

❏ **The group's critical requirement is assessed to be funding that will enable it to support its activities and sustain its war effort**

❏ **Al-Shabaab is suspected to be getting funding through conduct of illegal businesses**

❏ **Al-Shabaab also receives donations from Al-Qaida and Somalis in the diaspora**

❏ **The population also provides the recruitment base and intelligence to sustain operations. If these are targeted through hard, soft or smart power as appropriate, the group will be isolated and denied of resources to operate**

CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES

❑ Al-Shabaab critical vulnerability is assessed to be its illegal nature and the fact that it has been branded a terrorist group.

❑ Al-Shabaab designation as a terrorist group gives the government of Kenya the right to use all available means to fight against it invoking both domestic and UN resolutions against terrorism.

❑ The groups misinterpretation of the Quran also makes it vulnerable

❑ Another critical vulnerability is the fact that it has no known allies within Somalia

❑ This can create room for discord in areas it controls by critiquing its administration

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (CONT)

CRITIQUE PRESENT RESPONSE

Δ What is the State(s) Perception, & Response to the threat (E-W-M)?

Δ Why is it not working?

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (CONT)

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND ACTION

Present State Response

CRITIQUE PRESENT RESPONSE

Δ What is the State(s) Perception, & Response to the threat (E-W-M)?

Δ Why is it not working?

- Articulated in an Ends-Ways-Means Construct.

- What is the State's perception of the threat?

- How does the State frame the problem?

- How is the State currently responding to the threat?

- If there is an existing, documented strategy of policy-start there.

- Provide your critique of the current state response:
  - Why is it not working?
  - Does the State not understand the true nature of the threat?
  - It the State relying exclusively on kinetics?
  - Is the State violating international laws and norms?
  - Is there a mismatch in the State's E-W-M?

STRATEGIC ESTIMATE (CONT)

FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS AND ACTION

❑ **Critique:**

    ❑ **Is the state's perception accurate?**

    ❑ **Is the state making progress in defeating the threat?**

    ❑ **Does the state's response address the symptoms of the problem or the problem itself (the underlying causes)?**

    ❑ **Offer a thorough critique of the state response that identifies and explains its strengths and weaknesses.**

    NOTE: In constructing your critique, integrate identification of the threat group's CoG and CV and evaluate whether the state response is responding to these effectively.

EXAMPLE OF CRITIQUE OF KENYAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

The analysis of the Kenya government response will be based on its current strategy, examining the ends, ways and means through an integrated lines of effort. Kenyan goals are to degrade and ultimately destroy Al-Shabaab while operating under the umbrella of AMISOM. The secondary goal is to stabilize the Somali Government to provide security within its territory and hence stop the influx of refugees to Kenya and other transnational crimes. Kenya has enacted anti-terrorism laws in the Security Laws (Amendment Act 2014).

The public is well mobilized and sensitized about terrorism issues. However, issues of governance in the NER and parts of coastal regions remains unaddressed.
The Kenyan government launched Operation LINDA NCHI in 2011 which enabled it to advance and capture major towns that were held by Al-Shabaab including the city of Kismayo. Internally conducted Operation USALAMA WATCH in 2014 which aimed to search and arrest illegal immigrants in Nairobi. The government also launched Operation LINDA BONI aimed at clearing Boni Forest and the whole of Lamu County of Al-Shabaab cells. The government imposed curfew in the County of Lamu, Tana River and Mandera in an effort to control movement of unwanted persons.

KENYA'S RESPONSE AND CRITIQUE (CONT)

It commenced the construction of wall to cover the almost 700km Kenya- Somalia border to curb incursions and curtail movements of illegal persons and goods. The national government partners with county governments, faith-based organizations and other stake holders including community elders to fight radicalization and share information on Al-Shabaab activities. Kenya has also partnered with other African Union states to provide troops for AMISOM. Additionally, it has also continuously operated and liaised with the USA on intelligence sharing and coordination of operations. The government is mostly using the military and law enforcement to execute its strategy (focusing on the threat) and thus ignored the root.

Kenya's response to Al Shabaab

Source : Google Images

KENYA'S RESPONSE AND CRITIQUE

Critique of Kenya's Response

The Kenya government has not fully addressed the grievances of under development in the NER and coastal parts that Al-Shabaab is exploiting. The government has also not fully asserted itself in ungoverned areas to prevent free movement and setting up of operational bases by Al-Shabaab. Operation USALAMA WATCH which was mainly a law enforcement operation was condemned for being unethical in its conduct. Operation LINDA BONI is not making suitable progress due mainly to inter agency rivalry. Lack of coordination in intelligence effort to drive operations has been the major undoing of the government response.

If the National Intelligence Service was providing timely, actionable intelligence and coordinate seamlessly with other security agencies, incidents such as the Westgate attack in Nairobi, Garissa College attack, and the Mpeketoni attack would have been averted. There seems to be no effort to counter Al-Shabaab narratives in social media and in the mainstream media.

KENYA'S RESPONSE AND CRITIQUE (Cont)

The government is partnering with other non-state actors as allies but needs to be more coordinated in its own agencies and departments to address the grievances and the loopholes that Al-Shabaab is leveraging.

Kenya has internationalized the fight against Al-Shabaab and is partnering with state and non-state actors to achieve its goals. However, according to the Global Terrorism Database, Kenya has suffered 441 incidents associated with Al-Shabaab since October 2011, when Operation LINDA NCHI was launched as compared to 20 incidents that was incurred between 2006 and 2011.

Generally, Kenyan Government perceived the threat as terrorism. Therefore it leans on Heavy Kinetic line of effort employing military and police departments to defeat Al Shaabab in Kenyan and NER. The State's strategy is not working because it is not directed at the Root, Threat Narrative and its Strategy. Suffices to say that a change of strategy is required.

Q & A